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Abstract
What is so special and mysterious about the Continuum, this an-
cient, always topical, and alongside the concept of integers, most in-
tuitively transparent and omnipresent conceptual and formal medium
for mathematical constructions and the battle field of mathematical
inquiries ? And why it resists the century long siege by best mathe-
matical minds of all times committed to penetrate once and for all its
set-theoretical enigma ?
The double-edged purpose of the present study is to save from
the transfinite deadlock of higher set theory the jewel of mathemati-
cal Continuum – this genuine, even if mostly forgotten today raison
d’être of all set-theoretical enterprises to Infinity and beyond, from
Georg Cantor to W. Hugh Woodin to Buzz Lightyear, by simulta-
neously exhibiting the limits and pitfalls of all old and new reduc-
tionist foundational approaches to mathematical truth: be it Can-
tor’s or post-Cantorian Idealism, Brouwer’s or post-Brouwerian Con-
structivism, Hilbert’s or post-Hilbertian Formalism, Gödel’s or post-
Gödelian Platonism.
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In the spirit of Zeno’s paradoxes, but with the enormous historical
advantage of hindsight, we claim that Cantor’s set-theoretical method-
ology, powerful and reach in proof-theoretic and similar applications
as it might be, is inherently limited by its epistemological framework
of transfinite local causality, and neither can be held accountable for
the properties of the Continuum already acquired through geomet-
rical, analytical, and arithmetical studies, nor can it be used for an
adequate, conceptually sensible, operationally workable, and axiomat-
ically sustainable re-creation of the Continuum.
From a strictly mathematical point of view, this intrinsic limita-
tion of the constative and explicative power of higher set theory finds
its explanation in the identified in this study ultimate phenomenologi-
cal obstacle to Cantor’s transfinite construction, similar to topological
obstacles in homotopy theory and theoretical physics: the entangle-
ment capacity of the mathematical Continuum.
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I was beside the Master craftsman, delighting him
day after day, ever at play in his presence, at play
everywhere on his earth, delighted to be with the
children of men.
Proverbs 8:30-31
1 Introduction: overview of the challenges,
objectives, findings
The present study is carried out with a rather ambitious, if not unrealistic
forethought to eventually meet all major challenges of the controversial, cen-
tury long inquiry into the mathematical meaning of the Continuum. We leave
to the reader the final judgement to what extent, if at all, did we succeed.
The below order of listing of the specific challenges and the corresponding
objectives and findings of this study follows the common, mostly top-down
logic of expository presentations, from most general and abstract considera-
tions to more specific and technical problems.
2 Foundational discernment
We are finalizing here our elaborate and long on preparation discernment
process [6]-[12], on the one hand, of the ontological and intuitive charac-
ter and particular epistemic and technical implementations of the Con-
tinuum notion in modern «mainstream» mathematics. Here are some con-
clusions of this meticulous winnowing of the mathematical grain from some
transfinite set-theoretical chaff :
Challenge 1 . Foundational deadlock. What is the meaning of, and
what might be the lessons to learn from, the unsuccessful and yet system-
atic and, in the case of higher set theory, both grandiose and intricate, cen-
tury long foundational efforts to either explain the Continuum away
by adopting one or another philosophy of the Infinite, or to reclaim the
Continuum from naught by applying one or another mutually incompat-
ible and manifestly ad hoc accretion procedures: finitist, constructivist,
transfinite ?
Objective 1 . What is Mathematical Truth ? We feel the need to
confront here the fact that all Cantorian and post-Cantorian programs of the
transfinite interpretation of the Continuum, as well as their violent rejec-
tions by constructivist philosophies of mathematics are sharing paradoxically
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the same, central to every one of these systems article of faith, namely,one
or another, mutually incompatible forms of the absolutization of the ex-
istence of a specific, independent, and sovereign Mathematical
Truth, as in the following laconic, transparent, and conflicting affirmations
by Erret Bishop and Kurt Gödel:
«Our point of view is to describe the mathematical operations that can
be carried out by finite beings, man’s mathematics for short. In contrast,
classical mathematics concerns itself with operations that can be carried out
by God.» [20] (p. 9).
«Only someone who (like the intuitionist) denies that the concepts and
axioms of classical set theory have any meaning (or any well-defined meaning)
could be satisfied with such a solution, not someone who believes them to
describe some well-determined reality.» [43] (p. 520)
Finding 1 . Separate set-theoretical controversies from the ques-
tion of soundness of Classical Mathematics. As the above dialogue of
the deaf demonstrates, in their staunch defense of Georg Cantor’s set the-
ory, David Hilbert and Kurt Gödel have unfortunately and, as we intend to
show in this study, mistakenly identified the problem of epistemic mathemati-
cal sustainability of Classical Mathematics with that of Cantorian set theory,
and they did it by definitively deracinating the former from its rich ontological
background.
3 The Continuum in the light of Platonist
and formalist delusions
The famous Platonist thesis from Gödel’s philosophical testament of 1964
[44], quoted and contested below, will be followed (Section 5.1) by his two
related and very profound arguments, which maintain even today all their
visionary importance.
Challenge 2 . Platonist and formalist rupture. The following state-
ment of Kurt Gödel represents a quintessential Platonist rupture with the
mathematical ontological practice: «In geometry, the question as to whether
Euclid’s fifth postulate is true retains its meaning if the primitive terms are
taken . . . as referring to the behavior of rigid bodies, rays of light, etc. . . .On
the other hand, the objects of transfinite set theory . . . clearly do not belong
to the physical world, and even their indirect connection with physical expe-
rience is very loose. But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we
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do have something like a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is
seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true.»
[44] (pp. 267-268)
Objective 2 . Inquiring into Gödel’s juxtaposition. We will show
that by taking the initiative to clarify his characteristically Platonist point,
by his questioning the difference between physical and intuitive mathematical
perceptions, Kurt Gödel has opened the door for eventual refinements of this
difference which definitely undermine Gödel’s Platonist argument.
As all founders of science in Antiquity and modern times, from Pythagorus
to Francis Bacon to Johannes Kepler to Albert Einstein, we assume that the
visible world is sustained by its intrinsic intelligence, with mathematical and
natural sciences acquiring codified formal knowledge carefully distilled from
our mental and material, contemplative, descriptive, and performative expe-
riences. In particular:
Finding 2 . Intrinsic intelligence and extrinsic intelligibility of ob-
servable reality reflected in the Continuum notion. The mathematical
Continuum of modern times represents a rich conceptual distillation of
centuries long contemplation and practical observations of the propagation of
light, as well as the practice and theory of measurements and construction.
We will defend in this study the core ontological basis of the Continuum
as a phenomenologically elemental, axiomatically inscrutable insight into, or
model of, what is palpably perceived as spacial flow, or spacial unfolding.
4 Whither the transfinite Continuum ?
During the first half of the XXth century, Georg Cantor, David Hilbert,
and later Kurt Gödel, to name just these three key figures of the transfinite
revolution, have invested extraordinary intellectual and technical efforts, as
well as their monumental personal moral and scientific reputations – and, at
least in the case of Cantor and Gödel, their tragic destinies, – to impose on
the mathematical community a novel, purely transfinite interpretation of the
Continuum, reducing this richest and well-known since the time immorial
mathematical habitat to a stair on the grandiose transfinite ladder Ord, «set
on the earth with its top reaching to heaven», as in the biblical Jacob’s dream.
Challenge 3 . And behold: With all these high set theory specialists
incessantly ascending and descending on this ladder during the last century,
there is still no consensus, to put it mildly, as to the nature and viability
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of the transfinite interpretation of the Continuum. Besides, we still do not
know, and probably will never know, to what exactly transfinite staircase step
should we assign the Continuum: it is just another way to say that the famous
Continuum Hypothesis of Georg Cantor, CCH, is still hopelessly open.
Objective 3 . Why the transfinite Continuum ? Are there some sub-
stantial phenomenological and onto-epistemic underpinnings of this persist-
ing, unheard in the history of mathematics crisis of both the philosophical
and mathematical consensus concerning an important mathematical theory ?
Finding 3 . The story of invention of the transfinite Continuum
at glance. We demonstrate the epistemically pure symbolic nature, stripped
here of all technicalities, of the transfinite approach to the Continuum enigma:
Cantor’s symbolic powerset notation for the well-known machinery of Karl
Weierstrass of approximation of reals by rational numbers and Cantor’s trans-
finite invention, ontologically unrelated to this machinery, separately recur-
sively auto-applied and then amalgamated, also symbolically, by Cantor’s
well-ordering. «law of thought».
5 Axiomatic challenge
5.1 Kurt Gödel’s profound onto-epistemic insights
During the last two millennia, Euclidean geometry has been universally ac-
cepted and admired as the unsurpassed in its efficaciousness and beauty
paradigm of a perfectly disinterested and formal mathematical thinking [52].
Countless mathematical and, more general, scientific and philosophical the-
ories have been created following this apparently absolutely objective, sug-
gestive, extremely laconic, and formally irreproachable paradigm, with its
creative potential demonstrated, for example, by the recent exhaustive clas-
sification of finite sporadic groups.
Twenty years after the appearance of the transfinite theory of the Con-
tinuum, it has found its formalization in Zermelo-Fraenkel-Skolem ax-
iomatic system, ZFC, a masterpiece of elegancy and frugality. Further
investigations, the efforts to solve Cantor’ Continuum Hypothesis, CCH, in
the first place, have produced a number of new powerful axiomatic additions
to ZFC, still characteristically insufficient for solution of the CCH, whatever
might be their transfinitely recursive power.
Kurt Gödel has defended the legitimacy of these set-theoretic axiomatic
queries against the critics of the «new axioms set up in the never-never land
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of large cardinals» [69] and their «disconcerting tendency to produce indepen-
dence results rather than theorems in the usual sense» [93] by two decisive
for him and, in the context of the present study, profoundly suggestive argu-
ments which could be roughly characterized as subjective and objective:
1. «The mere psychological fact of the existence of an intuition which is
sufficiently clear to produce the axioms of set theory and an open series of
extensions of them suffices to give meaning to the question of the truth or
falsity of propositions like Cantor’s continuum hypothesis.» [44] (p. 268)
2. «. . . even disregarding the intrinsic necessity of some new axioms, and
even in case it has no intrinsic necessity at all, a probable decision about
its truth is possible also in another way, . . . namely [by] their fruitfulness in
mathematics and, one may add, possibly also in physics.» [44] (pp. 263, 269)
Gödel’s second argument has been successfully implemented by the school
of necessary uses of the Transfinite in finite mathematics [39], [40], and the
first one is still makes sense when we are confronted by violent denials of the
freedom of mathematical query:
«At the beginning of this century a self-destructive democratic principle
was advanced in mathematics (especially by Hilbert), according to which all
axiom systems have equal right to be analyzed, and the value of mathematical
achievement is determined, not by its significance and usefulness as in other
sciences, but by its difficulty alone, as in mountaineering. This principle
quickly led mathematicians to break from physics and to separate from all
other sciences. In the eyes of all normal people, they were transformed into
a sinister priestly caste of a dying religion, like Druids.» [3] (pp. 7-8)
5.2 Post-Gödlian incompleteness principle
And yet, with the stagnation of inquiries into the transfinite mystery of the
Continuum going into its second century, Gödel’s profound subjective and
objective insights are looking less and less satisfactory as possible ultimate
onto-epistemic arguments in favor of the viability and relevancy of higher set
theory for the Continuum research.
As to Gödel’s first, subjective argument, it remains apparently viable even
after being restated in a more generic form:
Thesis 1 . Gödelian thesis of the foundational legitimacy of math-
ematical intuition. Any intuitive, systematic, and intellectually mature
perception of a certain sufficiently rich system S of abstract objects and
their relationships, qualified to produce a relevant axiomatics, suffices to give
meaning to the question of the truth or falsity of propositions concerning this
system. We will call such systems pre-axiomatizable.
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The following immediate implication of the above thesis creates sort of
a «geological fault line» where two Gödelian arguments meet, to allow the
exposure of our contradictory argument:
Finding 4 . Proof-theoretical implication of the Gödelian thesis.
Any pre-axiomatizable system S, artifact assimilating the goodies of a suf-
ficiently rich and sophisticated mathematical and conceptual environment
similar to that which gave birth to higher set theory, allows a huge, super-
exponentially expanding «mathematical sci-fi novelization», i.e., cre-
ation of a multitude of «fully consistent mathematical theories» with
unlimitedly extending axiomatics enriched by new axioms not only «forced
themselves upon us as being true» (Gödel’s aphorism [44], p. 268), but
being also intuitively compelling and esthetically attractive.
Finding 5 . Post-Gödelian incompleteness principle. And yet, such
theories would have in their (more than) overwhelming majority, neither at
this juncture nor whenever in future, no ontologically sound, objectively veri-
fiable mathematical and/or notable extra-mathematical meaning outside their
proper, self-absorbed scenes of formal deductions inside the corresponding sys-
tem S and its extensions.
5.3 Transfinite axiomatic deadlock and its anticipated
Euclidean redemption
Gödel’s intricate arguments were meant to philosophically supplement his
and many others more direct mathematical argument in support of the vi-
ability of higher set theory, of its transfinite axiomatics, and of associated
with it pro and contra consistency results [27]:
«The proof that the axiom of parallels does not follow from the other Eu-
clid axioms did not close geometry, but made the emergence of non-Euclidian
geometries possible, and opened the question of recognizing, among all possi-
ble geometries, the most relevant for describing the physical world. Likewise,
Gödel’s and Cohen’s results show that several universes are possible from
ZFC, and, therefore, they open the study of the various possible universes.»
Objective 4 . Whither the mathematical Continuum ? Without con-
testing this popular vision of various possible set-theoretical universes,
we will demonstrate in this study that the mathematical Continuum can be
found in neither of them.
We will do it in several steps, starting with the analysis of the distinctive
characteristics of Euclidean and Zemelo-Fraenkel-Skolem axiomatic enter-
prises.
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5.4 Euclidean constative axiomatics versus set-theoretical
generative and performative axiomatics
Challenge 4 . What is the difference between Euclidean and set-
theoretical axioms, and if exists, does it matter ? Our query concerns
the nature of axioms of Set Theory, from ZF to ZFC to Axioms of Deter-
minacy to Axioms of Large Cardinals, which are typically transfinite
recursive principles and procedures of emergence of set-theoretical
entities acting on swaths of transfinite ordinals and cardinals [55].
We are advancing in the present study the understanding of the axiomatic
enterprise as a conditional and conditioned search for a formalization of
an objectively sustainable truth. The enterprise which is a part and
parcel, even if rarely recognized as such, of the contemporaneous to it general
human cultural and, even more general, existential endeavor shouldering its
way through the intellectual challenges of its time and building its axiomatic
instruments of research with due respect for, and professional knowledge of
the cultural and scientific heritage:
Objective 5 . Axiomatic commitment as a cultural challenge: re-
ductionist principles and the new phenomenology of light. (1) We
demonstrate in this study that the fundamental vision materialized by Canto-
rian set theory is distorted by uncritical reductionist universalization of finite
recursive procedures. (2) On the positive side, we are intending to enrich
the phenomenological background of inquiries into the mathematical Contin-
uum, extracted from the centuries long observations of light, by distilling into
abstract mathematical concepts the quantum mechanical phenomenon of en-
tanglement of light. (3) This phenomenological acquisition will expose the
locally causal character of transfinite universes of higher set theory and
exhibit the ultimate phenomenological obstacle to Cantor’s transfinite
construction, similar to topological obstacles in homotopy theory and the-
oretical physics, namely: the entanglement capacity of the mathemat-
ical Continuum.
Let us start with the first task, leaving the second one to the below
Section 6:
Finding 6 . Axiomatization modes: constative versus performa-
tive. We will demonstrate that, from a pure formal metamathematical point
of view, one needs to differentiate between the contemplative and con-
stative character of the Euclidean axiomatics, or for that matter, of group
theoretical or any similar «classical axiomatics», and the hazardously
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innovative, performative, recursive character of set-theoretical ax-
ioms, with our post-Turingean halting principle sealing the inescapably
hypothetical and conditional nature of the Cantorian fundamental laws of
thought and the post-Cantorian large cardinal principles [25].
5.5 Post-Turingean halting principle
The undecidability of the Halting Problem, an algorithmic projection of
Gödel’s incompleteness results, is well-known: there is no «halting-test
Turing machine» capable of distinguish between halting and non-halting
programs [100]. In other words, given a program, the only way to discover
whether it halts or not is to run it, possibly, indefinitely.
Transfinite recursive definitions and principles of higher set theory are
metamathematical and set-theoretical analogues of Turing machines: they
«calculate» new transfinite totalities. Hence, the following post-Turingean
metamathematical Halting Principle:
Finding 7 . Post-Turing Halting Barrier for performative, trans-
finitely recursive set-theoretical axioms. There exists neither general
metamathematical principle, nor logical criterion, nor verifiably terminating
computational procedure to establish the objective and substantial «truth»
of performative set-theoretical axioms of recursive nature postulating the ex-
istence of transfinite objects outside the already existing transfinite scale –
otherwise that is that «to run» the theory completed with new axioms until
it would be discovered some «independent necessary uses» of the object
in question.
Gerhard Gentzen’s pioneering work [42] has laid down the foundations
of the method of gauging the recursive proof-theoretical strength of finite
mathematical theories and combinatorial problems by ordinals. With all
known uncontroversial cases involving only countable ordinals: from Can-
tor’s 0 = ωω
ω.
..
[45], [86] to the first non-predicative ordinal Γ0 [34], [40].
Finding 8 . Corollary: the first uncountable ordinal ω1 is a class,
not a set. According to post-Turingean halting principle, the set-theoretical
existence of ω1 cannot be assured. The following proof-theoretical interpre-
tation of ω1 lends credit to this claim: Cantor’s first uncountable ordinal ω1
is the class of all countable ordinals, which eventually gauge the recursive
proof-theoretical strength of finite mathematical theories and combinatorial
problems; thus, ω1 represents the adequate, universal, ever emerging and
never completed ordinal scale of the power and sophistication of past and
future iterative logical arguments.
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6 New phenomenology bearing on the evolv-
ing Continuum notion
The above conclusions are buttressed by two outwardly independent and
yet intrinsically related mathematical and physical developments of the last
century: the emergence of Quantum Mechanics with its modern hands-on
branch of Quantum Information Processing and progress in Mathematical
Analysis, Diophantine Approximations, Celestial Mechanics.
Consequently, we claim that both the novel insights into arithmetical and
analytical enigmas of the Continuum and the counterintuitive quantum me-
chanical entanglement phenomena, implying the demise of the universal local
causality dogma, become crucial for all eventual progress of our understand-
ing of what is the Continuum:
Finding 9 . Entanglement obstacle to the transfinite enterprise.
We demonstrate the existence in the Continuum case of an intrinsic lim-
itation of the explicative and performative power of higher set
theory, finding its explanation in the identified in this study ultimate phe-
nomenological obstacle to Cantor’s transfinite construction, simi-
lar to topological obstacles in homotopy theory and theoretical physics. In
our case, it is the entanglement capacity of the mathematical Con-
tinuum.
7 Higher set theory Continuum brainteaser
Finally, let us consider, in the light of the findings of the present study, what
remains of the status of higher set theory, only recently fully in charge of the
Continuum research.
Challenge 5 . So what about higher set theory ? So what about
higher set theory, this vast, complex, technically intricate and conceptually
mostly incomprehensible and insecure for a mainstream mathematician field
of mathematical sciences ? The field conceived and, during the last hundred
years, matured as the core constituent of the foundations for mathematics
– to finally surrender its importance: because today, «among mathematicians,
there is a widespread view that ongoing current mathematics on the whole is
more reliable than any of the philosophically motivated programs that have
been proposed to replace it, and that the only foundation that need be con-
sidered (if any at all) is organizational.» [35]. Worse still: the field reputed
for its «inherently vague open problems» [33], unsettling «new axioms set up
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in the never-never land of large cardinals» [69], «disconcerting tendency to
produce independence results rather than theorems in the usual sense» [93].
And all this, in the intimidating environment of «interminable foundational
controversies» [35].
Objective 6 . Higher set theory Continuum brainteaser. We recog-
nize the need to be as clear about what are not the intended implications of
the present inquiry for higher set theory, as we were precise above about what
are its stated purposes. In particular, we see no reasons to share the popular
doubts [3],[69]-[72] of the legitimacy of higher set theory as mathemat-
ical domain. And we reject as mathematically particularly ill-considered all
recent finitist critiques [111] of proof theory results gauging the strength of an
axiomatically defined theory by an appropriate transfinite ordinal [87], [88].
Finding 10 . Higher set theory as programming language of trans-
finite design. In the opposite tack, we conclude that, as the conceptual and
mathematical Continuum enigma concerned, the trouble of higher set theory
is hidden exactly where its pride resides: in its most advanced, at the lim-
its of human imagination and beyond, built-in iterative mechanisms of
set generation. Accordingly, this theory is steadily gaining in its performa-
tive power on the expense of its contemplative, constative, descriptive, and
explicative abilities, to become finally a sophisticated programming lan-
guage of transfinite design, successfully and, as in its applications to
proof theory, usefully mimicking recursive aspects of Mathematical Infinity,
without being able nevertheless to advance new valuable insights into our un-
derstanding of the nature of the Continuum.
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